David Gordon
Imagine the scenario: the mass attack against Israel came from all sides, coordinated by Iran. Lebanon fired tens of thousands of missiles, and sent combat units across the border. Syria, Yemen, and Iraq sent missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles aimed at Isrrael’s heartland. Meanwhile from Gaza, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad followed, firing so many missiles, as to overwhelm the Iron Dome. Roads, electrical grides, communication systems, army bases, and airports were all destroyed.
This was the doomsday scenario that never happened – at least not yet. Dr. Mordechai Kedar, a Middle East scholar and lecturer in the Department of Arabic at Bar- Ilan University, predicted this tragic scenario six months before October 7th. Dr. Kedar is also a research fellow at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan and is the Vice President of “NEWS-RAEL – Pro Israeli Dynamic Feed,” a news site about the Middle East.
Iran’s Plan and Hamas’s Departure
“The Iranian plan was a barrage to destroy Israel within a week,” Kedar told Community Magazine. But Hamas went rogue on October 7th.
Hamas was directed to wait until the order came from Iran for a coordinated assault. The Islamic Republic wanted to attack when their nuclear capability was ready, to deter any retaliation.
When 200 senior Israeli Air Force fighter pilots froze their active reserve duty (meaning they would not serve if called for reserve duty) to protest proposed judicial reforms in March 2023, Hamas recognized this as a strong sign of the deep fissure in Israeli society and decided to capitalize on Israel’s weakness.
Kedar cited that the infighting and mass demonstrations “destroyed the image of Israel as a powerful country” to its neighbors. “It [the discord in Israeli society] inflated the Jihad glands in the bodies of our neighbors. They went out in the streets to celebrate. ‘No fighters, no pilots!’ It encouraged them to start the war.” Hamas was just looking for the right time, and, although some say that the Nova music festival was not even on Hamas’s radar, the festival came as a welcome opportunity for Hamas – thousands of unarmed partygoers in one place.
At the same time, Hamas sought to derail negotiations to bring about normalization between Israel and the Saudis. According to Kedar, the result of that normalization would have been a kind of peace-making domino effect: Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Mauritania, Tunisia, Mali, Chad, and Niger, would have followed suit, also normalizing relations with Israel, “mainly because of the American goodies.” But that would have diverted attention from the Palestinian cause, Kedar said – that would have been unacceptable to Hamas.
Hamas’s Aspirations
The plan, then, was to kidnap hundreds of Israelis, with the expectation that Israel would swap them for many more Palestinian prisoners. In 2011 a single IDF soldier, Gilad Shalit, was exchanged for 1,027 prisoners, almost all Palestinians and Arab Israelis, including prisoners who had killed Israelis in terrorist attacks. The anticipated trade-math was exhilarating. Clearly, the Palestinians miscalculated the aftermath.
Still, Jihadists believe that the destruction and civilian casualties are the cost necessary to destroy Israel, Kedar said. The Koran preaches that dying for Islam is praiseworthy, and therefore, “the tantrum over civilians killed is for the foreign media. It’s good PR.”
According to Kedar, the entire conflict centers around the notion that Israel stands opposed to radical Islam, because they believed that Islam was supposed to have replaced Judaism and Christianity. “And this is why the war was called the Al-Aqsa Flood, because when Jews are alive and praying, it means there’s a resurrection of Judaism, and something they cannot fathom.”
Kedar is an expert on Islamist groups, and Middle East affairs. He served 25 years in the Israel Defense Forces intelligence, specializing in Arab political discourse and media, and Islamic groups. Having written scores of articles on Arab politics, Kedar often appears in the media, providing analysis and commentary on Middle Eastern affairs.
Consideration of Clans
And now, in the struggle to determine a workable plan in the twelve months since Operation Swords of Iron launched, Kedar proposes splitting Gaza and the Palestinian Authority along its clan lines, administered by their own communities. The words “clans,” or” tribes,” he believes, should not conjure up only negative connotations. The social construct of clans is embedded strongly into Arab culture. If the clans were split up and had their own autonomy, this would avert conflicts between the clans, and Israel. “It fits the culture of the Middle East, because it fits the clan mentality.”
Countries where clans have their own separate autonomy are more successful. We see this in countries such as Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait, that have economic stability, safety, law, and order. These countries, by no coincidence, are run by clans: al-Sabah (Kuwait), al-Thani (Qatar), al-Nahayan (Abu Dhabi), al-Saud (Saudi Arabia), al-Hashem (Jordan), and so on. Compare these to the Arab countries where the clans are in disarray, such as Syria, Libya, Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran.
“A Palestinian state with all of the clans together would fail, because it [would exhibit] the same [type of] disease as seen in Syria,” he said.
Kedar wrote his PhD on the Syrian attempts to convince their people of the efficacy of a single clan, and to focus on a single enemy, Israel. “It didn’t work,” Kedar said, “because interclan and religious conflict killed hundreds of thousands.”
“If they had a minimal awareness of togetherness, they wouldn’t kill each other.
“Every clan sees the other clan as the enemy because they are ‘not from us,’” Kedar said, adding that prejudice and discrimination is rampant in the region.
Clans in Gaza
This can be seen between Gazans, and Arabs in Judea and Samaria. As far back as 1994, for example, when a hundred Gazans planned to come to Judea and Samaria for university studies, none of the locals were willing to rent them a room.
“Gazans are seen as Bedouin, people who live in the trees and in caves,” Kedar said, “and are not taken seriously. Those who live in the city view themselves as [being part of] high culture and high society.”
Kedar says that in terms of clanship, Palestinians live in compounds, or “you might say, a community.” The word in ancient Arabic for clan and neighborhood are homonyms, he added. “If you moved across the street to another clan, it would be like you were exiled. Clans don’t intermarry.” Kedar noted that in Hebron alone there are five different clans.
For at least eight decades, Gaza has been split into five administrative districts, without much clan overlap. Kedar’s idea is to let Gazan clans run their own affairs.
“This could very well work – with no Hamas, which no one wants,” he said. “Otherwise, a Palestinian state could very well turn into another Hamastan.”
In 2006, Hamas won the elections in Gaza. Hamas representatives are the majority of the legislative council of the Palestinian Authority, which prompted Mahmoud Abbas to “paralyze the council,” to maintain control. “To this day, Hamas says Abbas is illegitimate because of what he did,” Kedar states.
It’s a struggle for many to hear conversation about clans and tribes, Kedar said, because it isn’t politically correct. “It reminds people of the Indians – it raises all kinds of conscience problems.”
World leaders, especially those who are forming policy and donating billions in aid, operate with a Western mindset – involving innovation, reciprocal altruism, and human rights. “But this misunderstanding and ignorance of the Arab mindset isn’t just alive and kicking. It’s alive and killing.”
Looking Ahead
The world watches closely as to what will happen in Israel, now nearly a year since October 7th. Two daring assassinations carried out by Israel have increased tensions. Hizballah top commander Fauad Shukur (who was behind the rocket attack in the Druze village Majdal Shams where 12 children were killed while playing soccer) was killed in Beirut. Hamas’s leader Ismail Haniyeh (who travelled to Tehran to attend the inauguration ceremony of President Masoud Pezeshkian) was assassinated in Tehran. Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, agitated by the major security blunder by Tehran, has issued an order to strike Israel directly in retaliation for Haniyeh’s death.
Will Tehran strike? Will Operation Swords of Iron conclude, and to what resolution? Or will our prayers be answered by the coming of Mashiach?